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________________
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ADDENDUM A

39

I. STATEMENI' OF THE CASE
A. Nature Of The

case: This case is based upon Appellant

Barry

Searcy'_s

("Searcy") Count I civil cause of action for declaratory judgment based upon
Defendents 11 (hereinafter collectively identified as

11

:rrxx::11 ) alleged illegal

raising of revenue for IDOC uses through phone and cormnissary sales corrrnissions,
medical co-pay fees and photocopying fees.

Searcy appeals the district court's

grant of summary judgment in favor of all Defendants as to Count I of the Civil
Complaint.
B. The Course Of The Proceedings.

Searcy's Civil Complaint ,,as filed in

the Fourth District Court on May 18, 2011 •

(R, pp. 023-076).

IIX:x::'. filed their

Ans.ver to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on July 18, 2011.

(R, pp.088-

095).

On October 20, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Partial Motion For Surnmary Judgment
Against Defendant IDOC as to Liability Only on Count I, llith a supporting
memorandum and affidavit, as to his Count I state declaratory judgment claim.
(R, pp.104-180).
On March 6, 2012, IDOC filed their Motion For

Summary

Judgment, llith a

supporting Statement of Material Facts, memorandum (in support of their o.rm
and in opposition to Searcy' s motion for summary judgment) and affidavits, .vhich

1

The named Defendants are the IDAHO STATE BOA.RD OF CDRRECTION ( "ISBOC") ,
the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CDRRECI'ION ("IDOC"), CAROLYN fl'.!ELINE ("Meline"), JIM
TIBBS ("Tibbs"), JAY NIELSEN ("Nielsen"), ROBIN SANDY ("Sandy"), ANNA JANE
DRESSEN ("Dressen"), BRENT REINKE ("Reinke") , PAM SONNEN ("Sonnen"), 'IDNY MEATI'E
( "Meatte"), SUSAN FUJINAGA ( "Fuj inaga"), THED LOWE ( "LotJe"), and SHIRLEY AUDENS
("Audens"), and are sued in their official capacities and as State employees.
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sought summary judgment on all of Searcy's claims, including his claim for
declarato:ry judgment.
On

(R, pp.191-435).

March 26, 2012, Searcy responded to IDOC' s motion for summary judgment

and replied to his o,m partial motion for summary judgment.
His response / reply Nas supported by an affidavit.

(R, pp.478-495).

(R, pp.438-477).

On

March 30, 2012, IDOC replied to Searcy's response to their motion for summary
judgment.

(R, pp.496-506).

A hearing Nas held on the parties' cross-motions

for summary judgment on April 26, 2012.
On

(R, p.510).

June 13, 2012, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and

Order Denying in Part Plaintiff's Partial Motion For Surnmary Judgment Against
Defendant IDOC; Granting in Part Defendants' Motion For
Setting Schedule for Further Briefing.

(R, pp.511-530).

SUmmary

Judgment; and

Therein, the district

court found "that the funds collected from the telephone and commissa:ry
commissions, deposited in the state treasu:ry, and appropriated back to IDOC
are legislatively authorized pursuant to

r.c. §

67-3611;" found "that the

generation and collection of such funds is not a violation of Article II,
Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution relating to the separation of poNers betNeen
the three branches of government" and meets "the mandate of Idaho Constitution
Article VII, Section 16 that "[t]he legislature shall pass all laNS necessa:ry
to car:ry out the provisions of this article" and the mandate of Idaho
Constitution Article X, Section 1 that penal institutions shall be "supported
by the state in such manner as may be presecribed by laN. 1111

(R, p.515, L.24

- p.516, L.14).
HoNever, the district court requested further submissions from the parties
on the folloNing topics: (1) the issue of legislative revieN of the specific
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 7

policies or procedures authorizing or requiring the collection of the hobby
craft, medical co-pay and photocopy fees; (2) the issue of ,;,hether the State
Board of Correction has the "exclusive" authority to institute user fees to
off-set costs in light of the legislature's activity in that area; and (3) the
process by Mch medical co-pay fees are accounted for ••• discussing
specifically Alhether such process meets the constitutional requirement that
the legislature provide such revenue as needful.
On

(R, p.529, Ls.3-13).

August 6, 2012, IlXlC filed their Supplemental Memorandum in Support

of Defendants' Motion for

SUrnrnary

Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (hereinafter, "Defendants' Supplemental
Memorandum") (R, pp.542-643).

Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum ,;,as supported

by affidavits (R, pp.564-643).
On

August 27, 2012, Searcy filed his Supplemental Memorandum in Support

of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion For

Summary

Memorandum") (R, pp.646-661).

Judgment (hereinafter, "Plaintiff's Supplemental
On

the same date, Searcy also filed his Motion

To Reconsider The Court's Memorandum Decision And Order Filed June 13, 2012

(hereinafter, "Plaintiff's Motion To Reconsider") and supporting memorandum.
(R, pp.662-681 ).
On

September 24, 2012, the district court entered its Order Granting in

Part Defendants' Motion for
On

Summary

Judgment.

(R, pp.688-690).

March 1, 2013, IlXlC responded to Plaintiff's Motion To Reconsider.

(R, pp.699-711 ).
pp.712-720).

On March 7, 2013, Searcy replied to ~ · s response.

Searcy's reply ,;,as supported by an affidavit.

(R,

(R, pp.721-724).

A hearing ,;,as held on the parties' supplemental briefing and Plaintiff's Motion
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8

To Reconsider on March 8, 2013.

(R, p.725).

On May 16, 2013, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order

Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider; Denying Plaintiff's Motion For Partial
Surmnary Judgment; and Granting in Part Defendants' Motion for Surmnary Judgment.
(R, pp.726-738).

Therein, the district court incorporated by reference its

Jfuneil.3,, 2012 Memorandum Decision and Order.
As

(R, p.729, Ls.9-+1)

to Searcy's Article II, Section 1 separation of :po,;rers claim (as applied

to the hobby craft surcharge, medical co-pay and photocopy fees only), the
district court noted that "the legislature has not explicitly provided for the
specific fees at issue in this case via statute."

(R, p.733, Ls.22-23).

Ho,;rever, the district court found that "in the time since the filing of this
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on June 1 3, 201 2, IDAPA Rules have been
promulgated setting the IIX>C fee structure, including the hobby craft surcharge,
the photocopy fee, and the medical co-pay fee" and concluded that "[b]ecause
the Defendants have taken remedial action to promulgate IDAPA rules subject
to legislative oversight, the oourt finds no.'1T that the hobby craft surcharge,
the photocopy fee, and the medical co-pay fee are not a violation of the
separation of :po11Ters bet,;reen the executive and legislative branches of state
government pursuant to Idaho Constitution Article II, Section 1.

In addition,

the Court finds that any claim made by the Plaintiff that the fees in question
should have been promulgated as rules pursuant to I.C. § 20-212, is moot."
(R, pp.734, Ls.15-17 and 21-24 - pp.735, Ls.2).
As

to Searcy' s Article X, Section 1 and Article VII, Sections 2 and 16 claims

(as applied to the medical co-pay and photocopy fees only), the district court
noted that Article X, Section 1 provides in pertinent part that " ••• penal
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9

institutions • • • shall be established and supported by the state in such manner
as may be prescribed by latJ;" that Article VII, Section 2 provides in pertinent

part that "[t]he legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful;"
and that Article VII, Section 16 provides that "[t]he legislature shall pass
all latJs necessary to carry out the provisions of this article."

(R, p.735,

Ls.4-20).
HotJever, the district court found that "the medical co-pay and photocopy
fees still at issue in this case are user fees and are not taxes.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article VII, §§ 2 and 16
must be dismissed."

(R, p.736, Ls.10-12).

The district court further found

that "the Defendants have broad authority to set the State's policy regarding
the control, direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state pursuant
to Idaho Constitution, Article X, § 5, and they have taken appropriate remedial
action to adopt IDAPA Rules concerning the department's fee structure tJith
legislative oversight as required by I.C. § 20-212" and that "in light of the
remedial action taken by the adoption of appropriate IDAPA Rules, the Defendants
have not exceeded the authority granted to them in the Idaho Constitution, nor
have they exceeded the authority granted to them by the legislature pursuant
to I.C. § 20-212."

(R, p.736, Ls.15-23).

On June 4, 2013, the district court entered its Order Denying Plaintiff's

Motion to Reconsider; Denying Plaintiff's Motion For Partial
and Granting Defendants' Motion for

SUrnmary

SUrnmary

Judgment;

Judgment (R, pp.750-752) and Judgment

(R, pp.753-755).
Searcy timely filed his Notice of Appeal on July 15, 2013.
772; see also Amended Notice of Appeal at R, pp.797-801 ).
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 10

(R, pp.766-

C. Statement Of The Facts.

Plaintiff Barry Searcy is an inmate at the

Idaho State Correctional Institution in Bouse, Idaho.

On May 18, 2011, Searcy

filed the Civil Complaint in this case, naming as defendants the Idaho State
Board of Correction ("ISBOC") and the Idaho Department of Correction, along
tJith individual defendants carolyn Meline, Jim Tibbs, Jay Nielsen, Robin Sandy,
Anna

Jane Dressen, Brent Reinke, Pam Sonnen, Tony Meatte, SUsan Fujinaga, Theo

LotJe and Shirley Audens in their official capacities and as State employees.
(R, p.512, Ls.1-6).

Core allegations .vhich lie at the heart of Searcy's case

are alleged at Paragraphs 34-36 of the Complaint:
34. During the relevant times, in a scheme to circumvent the
constitutional and statutory constraints on the legitimate means of securing
revenue for IDOC uses, the Defendants executed, implemented, maintained
and/or enforced IDOC policies, rules, practices and contracts as a means
to take and obtain moneys belonging to Plaintiff Searcy and thousands of
other persons totaling in the millions of dollars.
35. Defendants' scheme illegally diverted moneys belonging to
Plaintiff Searcy and thousands of other persons for IlXlC uses, tJithout
express constitutional or statutory authority to do so, through phone and
commissary sales commissions, medical co-pay fees, photocopy fees and hobby
craft surcharges.
36. Defendants' scheme also illegally diverted moneys belonging to
the thousands of family, friends and associates of IlXlC inmates .vho provide
support for said inmates, for IDOC uses, ~ithout express constitutional
or statutory authority to do so, through direct phone time and corrrnissary
purchases.
(R, p.030).
Pursuant to the subsequent findings of the district court, it is undisputed
that IDOC charges the follotJing fees, commissions and co-pays to inmates .vho
use the applicable programs or services: (1) sales commissions from telephone
time purchases made by IDOC inmates and/or their family, friends and associates;
(2) corrmissary sales commissions; (3) medical co-pay fees; and (4) photocopying
fees.

Further, it is undisputed that the Idaho legislature has not enacted

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11

any statute specifically authorizing :O:X:C to impose the fees, commissions and
co-pays (collectively referred to as "fees") .vhich are the subject of the
Plaintiff's claims.

Each of the fees imposed by Irxx: al'."e the subject of IlXlC

policies or procedures and operate generally as folloNs:
>

IlXlC collects commissions on sales of telephone time and commissary
goods and deposits such commissions into the Inmate Management Fund
("IMF") for deposit into the state treasury pursuant to :O:X:C Standard
Operating Procedure ("SOP") 114.03.03.014. The legislature then
appropriates IMF funds back to :O:X:C each year as part of the budget
process.

>

Pursuant to :O:X:C SOP 405.02.01.001 (Access to Courts), inmates are
charges a fee of ten cents ( $. 1 0) per page for photocopies. Indigent
inmates are not charged the fee for photocopying and all photocopying
may be subject to page limits in accordance Mith court rules.

>

IlXlC Policy 411 provides that "[i]t is the policy of the Idaho Board
of Correction that the Idaho Department of Correction (:O:X:C) and its
contractors charge offenders incarcerated at IlXlC facilities a copay for medical and pharmacy services, but do not deny access to
medical, dental, and mental health services .vb.en the offender does
not have the resources to pay for such services." IDOC SOP
411.06.03.01 (Medical Co-Pay) provides that an offender-initiated
medical visit is assessed a five dollar ($5.00) medical co-pay fee.
ewe Nork release offenders are assessed a ten dollar ($10.00) medical
co-pay fee. A three dollar ($3.00) pharmacy service medical co-pay
fee is assessed for dispensing either over-the-counter or prescription
medications per course/treatment or per prescription. Employed ewe
Nork release offenders are assessed a five dollar ($5.00) pharmacy
co-pay fee. Medical co-pay funds are used by :O:X:C to offset general
fund medical expenses.

(R, pp.512, Ls.7 - pp.513, Ls.4).
Count I of the Civil Complaint is entitled "Violation of Idaho Code Section
20-212; Idaho Constitution, Article II,§ 1; Article VII,§§ 2, 5 and 16;
Article X, § 1; and Idaho Code§ 18-314; Under Idaho Code§§ 10-1201 et seq."
(R, p.041; p.513, Ls.11-14).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 12

In Count I, Searcy presented the folloNing

declaratory judgment question (R, p.041, at Paragraph 94) to be ansA7ered by
the Court:

2

94. The question to be detennined here is this: Does the raising
of revenue for IIXlC uses by Defendants, the Board, the IIX)C, Meline, Tibbs,
Neilsen, Sandy, Dressen, Reinke, Sonnen, Meatte, Fujinaga, LoA7e and Audens,
through phone and commissary commissions, medical co-pay fees, photocopying
fees and hobby craft surcharges, exceed and violate the scope of rule making
authority granted under Idaho Code Section 20-212; and/or violate the
provisions of Idaho Constitution, Article II, Section 1; Article VII,
Sections 2, 5 and/or 16; Article X, Section 1; and/or Idaho Code Section
18-314?
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
ISSUE I.
Did the district court err in concluding that the revenue raised by IIX)C
through medical co-pays and photocopy fees does not violate Article II, Section 1
of the Idaho Constitution and/or Idaho Code Section 20-212 by ruling that IDAP~
Rules promulgated by

IIXlC

on November 2, 2012 A7ere a "remedial action?"
ISSUE II.

Did the district court err in concluding that the revenue raised by

IIXlC

through medical co-pays and photocopy fees does not violate Article X, Section 1
of the Idaho Constitution by ruling that IDAPA Rules promulgated by

IIXlC

on

November 2, 2012 A7ere a "remedial action?"

2

Searcy has since A7ithdra.Nl'.l his Article VII,§ 5 claim. Further, the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of IIXlC as to Searcy' s
Article VII,§§ 2 and 16, I.C. § 18-314, and the hobby craft surcharge claims
are not part of the subject matter of this appeal.
APPELLANT' S BRIEF - 13

ISSUE III.
Did the district court err in concluding that the canmissions charged for
telephone time and commissary goods are funds arising from the sale of goods
or services under I.C. § 67-3611 Nhere, under the applicable summary judgment
standards,

:O::OC

had the burden of satisfying all of the elements of their

affirmative statutory defense and failed to do so?
III. STANDARDS OF RE.VIEW
standards Of Revie11 For Declaratory Judgment Claims:

Idaho's Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, I.C. §§ 10-1201 et seq., provides
that "Courts of record 11ithin their respective jurisdictions shall have poller
to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, Nhether or not further
relief is or could be claimed."

I.C. § 10-1201.

"Any person ••• Nhose rights,

status or other legal relations are affected by a statute ••• may have determined
any question of construction or validity arising under the ••• statute ••• and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations there under."
I.C. § 10-1202.

The "act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle

and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity lli th respect to rights,

status and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and
administered."

I.C. § 10-1212.

Standards Of Revie,1 For Rule 56 Motion For Smmary Judgment:
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary
judgment.

"A party seeking •• to obtain a declaratory judgment may ••• move

llith or llithout supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in that party's
favor upon all or any part thereof."

I.R.C.P. 56 (a).

"The judgment sought

shall be rendered forthllith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -
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file, together llith the affidavits, if any, sho,;, that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of la,;,."

I.R.C.P. 56(c).

"The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment
does not change the applicable standard of revie,;,, and [the] Court must evaluate
each party's motion on its o,m merits."

Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v.

La. Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001 ).

"Those standards

require the district court, and this Court upon revie,;,, to liberally construe
the facts in the existing record in favor of the nonrnoving party, and to dra,;,
all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonrnoving party."
Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 469, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986).

If there is

no genuine issue of material fact, there is only a question of la,;, over ,;,hich
the Court Nill exercise free revie,;,.

Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho

45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002).
"Summary

judgment must be entered against the nonrnoving party ,mo fails

to make a sho,;,ing sufficient to establish existence of an element, tJhich is
essential to his case and upon tJhich he ,;,ill bear the burden of proof at trial. 11
McGilvray v. Farmers Ne,;, World Life Insurance Co., 136 Idaho 39, 42, 28 P.3d
380, 383 (2001) (citing Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho
714, 918 P.2d 583 (1996); State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho
267, 899 P.2d 977 (1995); Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126,
127 (1988), citing Celotex v. catrett, 477
91 L.F.d.2d 265, 273 (1986)).

u.s.

317, 322, 106

s.ct.

2548, 2552,

"If the nonrnoving party cannot make a sho,;,ing

on elements essential to his claims, "there can be no genuine issue of material
fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element on the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -
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nonrnoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.""
at 42 (citing Celotex, 477
273) •

u.s.

at 322-23, 106

s.cr.

Id.,

at 2552, 91 L.F.d.2d at

'Ihe supreme Court exercises free revietl over questions of lall.

Sherer

v. Pocatello School Dist. #25, 143 Idaho 486, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006).
IV. ARGUMENT

ISSUE I.

The district court erred in concluding that the revenue raised by IIX)C through
medical co-pays and photocopy fees does not violate Article II, Section 1 of
the Idaho Constitution and/or Idaho Code Section 20-212 by ruling that IDAPA
Rules promulgated by IIX)C on November 2, 2012 llere a "remedial action."
A.

The legislature's exclusive poller under Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho
Constitution to raise revenue, appropriate funds and make lallS.
Article II of the Idaho Constitution is titled Distribution of Pollers and

provides:
§ 1 • Deparbnents of government

The pollers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or
collection of persons charged llith the exercise of pollers properly belonging
to one of these departments shall exercise any pollers properly belonging
to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed
or permitted.
Provision after provision of Idaho's Constitution sets forth that the poller
to raise revenue and appropriate funds, llhether through taxes, fees or other
means, ultimately derives from and lies exclusively llith the legislature and
pursuant to their duly enacted lalls.
1.

The legislature's exclusive po,;rer to raise revenue.

It is the legislative branch, not the executive or judicial branches, that
is exclusively empollered to raise revenue and appropriate funds for the state
of Idaho.
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Idaho Constitution, Article VII is entitled "Finance and Revenue."

It

provides at Section 2 that the "legislature shall provide such revenue as may be
needful ••• and applies particularly to revenue for state purposes."
Board of Cbmm'rs, 20 Idaho 392, 399, 119 P. 41, 43 (1911).

Fenton v.

It also states at

Section 6 that the legislature may by laN invest in municipal corporate
authorities "the poNer to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such
corporation."

HONever, "such poNer is limited by the taxing poNer authorized by

the legislature."

BreNster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765, /

767 (1988)(citing Sun Valley Co. v. City of
P.2d 147, 150 (1985)).

Sun

Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 427, 708

It also sets forth at Section 13 that "No money shall be

draHn fran the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by laN" and at
Section 14 that "No money shall be draHn from the county treasuries except ••• in
such manner and form as shall be prescribed by the legislature. 11

Section 18

1

provides for the Idaho Millennium Permanent EndoNLilent Fund and that "money ••• may
be appropriated or otherNise directed to the fund by the legislature" and for the

"Idaho Millennium Income Fund, ,mich ••• is subject to appropriation as provided
by laN;" and mandates at Section 16 that the "legislature shall pass all laNs
necessary to carry out the provisions of this article."
Idaho Constitution, Article VIII is entitled "Public Indebtedness and
Subsidies."

It provides at section 1 that the "legislature shall not in any

manner create any debt or debts, liability or liabilities ••• unless the same
shall be authorized by laN;" states at Section 2A that the "legislature may
enact laNs authorizing the state to establish a bond bank authority to purchase
the bonds, notes or other obligations of a municipality ••• as authorized by
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latl;" sets forth at Section 3A that "Counties of the state may in the manner
prescribed by latl issue revenue bonds;" declares at Section 3B that "Port
districts may ••• be financed for ••• and may in the manner prescribed by latl
issue revenue bonds to finance the costs thereof;" provides at Section 3C that
"public hospitals ••• may ••• in the manner prescribed by latl, finance the costs
thereof;" and sets forth at Section 5 that the "legislature may enact latls
authorizing • • • nonrecourse revenue bonds or other nonrecourse revenue
obligations and to apply the proceeds thereof in the manner and for the purposes
heretofore or hereafter authorized by latl.
Idaho Constitution, Article IX is entitled "Education and Land Schools."
It provides at Section 3 that the "earnings of the public school permanent
endoNIDent fund shall be deposited into the public school earnings reserve fund

and distributed ••• in such manner as may be prescribed by latl;" states at
Section 10 that the "Universities of Idaho, as established by existing latls,
is hereby confinned" and that the "regents shall have ••• the control and
direction of all funds of, and appropriations to, the university, under such
regulations as may be prescribed by lall;" and sets forth at Section 11 that
the "permanent endoNIDent funds ••• may be invested ••• pursuant to state latl."
Idaho Constitution, Article XV is entitled "Water Rights."

It provides

at Section 1 that "use of all tlaters ••• for sale, rental or distribution •••
may be hereafter sold, rented, or distributed ••• in the manner prescribed by
latl;" states at Section 2 that the "right to collect rates or compensation for
the use of tlater ••• can not be exercised except by authority of and in the manner
prescribed by latl;" sets forth at Section 6 that the "legislature shall provide
by latl, the manner in llhich reasonable maximum rates may be established to be
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charged for the use of .!later sold, rented, or distributed for any useful or
beneficial purpose;" and mandates at Section 7 that there "shall be constituted
a Water Resource Agency, canposed as the Legislature may no.ll or hereafter
prescribe, llhich shall have the po.Iler to ••• issue bonds ••• to be repaid from
revenues or projects • • • under such la.lls as may be prescribed by the
Legislature."
Idaho Constitution, Article XVIII is entitled "County Organization."

It

provides at Section 6 that "all taxes shall be collected by the officer or
officers designated by la.ll" and that the "legislature shall provide for the
strict accountability of county, to.llilShip, precinct and municipal officers for
all fees llhich may be collected by them, and for all public moneys llhich may
be paid to them, or officially come into their possession."
of taxing po.Iler ••• is not self-executing or unlimited.

Hollever, "the grant

It is limited by llhat

taxing po.Iler the legislature authorizes in its implementing legislation."
Bre.llster, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d at 766.

"[I]f they have no statutory po.Iler to

do so, then they have no po.Iler llhatever to do so."

Fenton, 20 Idaho at 404,

119 P. at 45.
Indeed, even llithin the legislature, bills for raising revenue must
originate in the house of representatives.
Section 1 4.

See Idaho Constitution, Article III,

The purpose of incorporating this provision into the constitution

is that the enactment of la.lls for raising revenue is the exercise of one of
the highest prerogatives of government and the people have reserved the right
to decide this necessity to that body of the legislature llhich comes most
directly from the people.

Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557, 207 P. 720, 722 (1922);

J.C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 54 Idaho 374, 392, 32 P.2d 784, 792 (1934) ("It
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is for the legislature to determine the tax policy of the state, subject only
to the limitations prescribed by the Constitution.").
The phrase "as shall be prescribed by lall" means that "the pollers ••• [are]
statutory and limited, and that such boards can only exercise those pollers
granted them by statute."
2.

Fenton, 20 Idaho at 404, 119 P. at 45.

The legislature's exclusive poller to make lall.

"The Constitution of the state of Idaho and this Court, through its
interpretation in the cases cited herein, have clearly established that the
legislative po'.tler llas vested in the legislature." Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,
664, 791 P.2d 410 (1990).

"The courts [and executive] may not substitute their

o,m llisdom and policy for the Legislature's."

Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v.

Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, 717, 78 P.2d 105, 116 (1938); Troutner v. Kempthome,
142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926, 930 (2006).
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional lall is that the poller conferred
upon the legislature to make lalls cannot be delegated by that department to any
other body or authority."

Mead, 117 Idaho at 665, 791 P.2d 410.

The Idaho Supreme

Court has consistently held that administrative rules or regulations are "less

than the equivalent of statutory la.tl. 11

Id.

"While the poller to make lall lies exclusively llithin the province of the
legislature (Idaho Constitution, art. 3 §§ 1, 15), the legislature may
constitutionally leave to administrative agencies the selection of the means and
the time and place of the execution of the legislative purpose, and to that end
may prescribe suitable rules and regulations."

Id., at 664.

"Ho.tlever, llhile

these rules and regulations may be given the 'force and effect of lall,' they do
not rise to the level of statutory lall. 11
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Id.

"[W]hat the legislature delegated

Nas not a legislative or laN making authority, but, an authority to make rules

or regulations."

Id., at 665.

Further, the Idaho supreme Court "has consistently found the executive rule
making authority to be rooted in a legislative delegation, not a poNer
constitutionally granted to the executive."
3.

Id., at 667.

Idaho Code Section 20-212.

Idaho Cede Section 20-212(a) provides in pertinent part that the "state board
of correction shall make all necessary rules to carry out the provisions of this
chapter not inconsistent Mith express statutes or the state constitution[.]"
NotJh.ere in this statute does it state that ID'.J<: may raise revenue for IIXlC purposes
outside of Idaho's constitutionally provided legislative process, or that I ~
may collect commissions or assess monetary charges for services rendered to
.
t es. 3
1nrna

Searcy filed his Complaint on May 18, 2011.

(R, pp.023-076).

SUbsequently,

the district court specifically found that "it is undisputed that the Idaho
legislature has not enacted any statute specifically authorizing IIXlC to impose

3

Prior to bringing this suit, Searcy exhausted all available administrative
remedies by utilizing the IIXlC Concern Form/ Grievance/ Appeal of Grievance
("Grievance Process"). (R, pp.028, 049-055 (Complaint, at ,I 25, and at
Appendix A) ) • 'Ibroughout the Grievance Process, IIXlC employees relied on
provisions of I.e.§ 20-212 as authorization for their revenue raising scheme.
(R, pp.053-055 (Complaint, at Appendix A, pgs. 4-6)).
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the fees, comnissions [and] co-pays ••• .vhich are the subject of the Plaintiff's
claims. 114

(R, p.512, Ls.12-14).

Hollever, the district court found that "the record does not currently
establish .vh.ich, if any, of the policies or procedures imposing the fees llhich
are the subject of this case llere enacted via the rule-making procedure set forth
in I.C. § 20-212" (R, p.519, Ls.11-13) and ordered supplemental briefing of both
parties "on the issue of legislative reviell of the specific policies or procedures
requiring the collection of the fees remaining in this case."
20).

(R, p.519, Ls.19-

Only then did IIXlC finally admit that the "IIXlC policies and procedures

imposing the fees at issue in this case (IIXlC SOP 405.02.01.001, IIXlC Policy 411,
IIXlC SOP 411.06.03.001, IIXlC Policy 608, and IIXlC SOP 608.02.00.001) llere not
promulgated in accordance IJ'ith the procedures set forth in Idaho Code§ 20-212[.]"
(R, p.551).
B.

The district court erred granting surrmary judgment in favor of IIXlC on
Searcy's Article II, Section 1 and Idaho Code Section 20-212 claims.
The district court specifically found "the legislature has not explicitly

provided for the specific fees at issue in this case via statute."
Ls.22-23).

(R, p.733,

Thus, it is against this finding and the above described backdrop

of Idaho constitutional, statutory and case lall, and the procedural history of
this case, that the district court ultimately ruled that:

4

Searcy maintains at Issue III, beloll, that the phone and comnissary revenue
are not raised pursuant to I.e.§ 67-3611. Therefore, that revenue also applies
to and is the subject of this Issue I and Issue •II ,1 belo.v.
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"[I]n the time since the filing of this Court's Merrorandum Decision and Order
on June 13, 2012, IDAPA Rules have been promulgated setting the IIX>C fee
structure, including the hobby craft surcharge, the photocopy fee, and the
medical co-pay fee" and concluded that "[b]ecause the Defendants have taken
remedial action to promulgate IDA.PA rules subject to legislative oversight,
the court finds notJ that the hobby craft surcharge, the photocopy fee, and
the medical co-pay fee are not a violation of the separation of potJers bettJeen
the executive and legislative branches of state government pursuant to Idaho
Constitution, Article II, Section 1. In addition, the Court finds that any
claim made by the Plaintiff that the fees in question should have been
promulgated as rules pursuant to I.C. § 20-212, is moot."
(R, p.734, Ls.15-17 and 21-24 - p.735, Ls.2).
Respectfully, the district court erred.
According to II:XX:'., their authority to make rules tJhich raise revenue is
implied under the umbrella of their general authority to have the control,
direction and management of the penitentiaries.
pp.546-552.

See, e.g., R, pp.419-421;

HotJever, this argument begs the Court to ignore the overtlhelrning

body of Idaho constitutional and statutory latJ, and its interpretation by the
Idaho supreme Court, that the potJer to raise revenue is not implied, but must
be expressly and specifically granted by the legislature and that ultimately,

the potJer to raise revenue comes from the legislature.
IIX::>C's argument is further undermined by the fact that the legislature has
provided them, in numerous instances, tJith express statutory authority for other
types of revenue raising and monetary assessments.

See, e.g., I.C. § 20-102A

(express statutory authority for the penitentiary earnings reserve fund);

§ 20-103 (authority for the penitentiary income fund);§ 20-2090 (authority for
forfeiture of contraband property or money found in possession of inmates);
§ 20-225 (authority for payment of cost of supervision under probation and parole);
§ 20-225A (authority for interstate compact application fee);§ 20-241 (authority
to accept federal and other funds);§ 20-242 (authority for furloughed prisoners
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to pay prisoner's board, personal expenses, and costs of administering such
prisoner's tJOrk furlough program); and § 20-245 (authority to charge offenders
performing cormnunity service tJOrk an hourly fee for purposes of providing NOrker's
compensation insurance) •
IIXJC's p::isition begs the question tih.y, if they possess the implied authority
to impose fees upon those in their supervision to offset costs, is it necessary
for the legislature to pass these numerous other laNs tih.ich expressly raise revenue
for IIXJC if IIXJC already has this implied authority?
The ans,;rer to this question is simple: the legislature did not "perfor:m an
idle act by enacting a meaningless provision."

Roberts v. Board of Trustees,

Pocatello School District No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 893, 11 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2000).
Instead, the legislature did tihat only the legislature can do - it passed laNs
Nhich expressly and specifically raised revenue for IIXlC as part of the
legislature's exclusive constitutional mandate to raise revenue and support the
state's penal institutions.

IIXlC's raising of revenue Nithout express statutory

authority invades the province of the legislature.
1.

Idaho Supreme Court held in Mead v. Arnell that administrative
rules do not rise to the level of statutory laN, thus, IIXlC's IDAPA
Rules promulgated on November 2, 2013 are not an adequate "remedial
'l'tle

action."

The district court's ruling infers that IlXlC's IDAPA rules, only promulgated
after and under the pressure of this litigation, rise to the level of statutory
laN.

The Idaho Supreme Court has already held other rise in Mead v. Arnell, and

the district court erred in this regard.
"'Ihe Constitution of the state of Idaho and this Court, through its
interpretation in the cases cited herein, have clearly established that the
legislative p::>Ner Nas vested in the legislature."
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Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,

664, 791 P.2d 410 (1990).

"The courts [and executive] may not substitute their

o,m N"isdom and policy for the legislature's."

Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v.

Balderston, 58 Idaho 692, 717, 78 P.2d 105, 116 (1938); Troutner v. Kempthorne,
142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926, 930 (2006).
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional laN" is that the poller conferred
upon the legislature to make lalls cannot be delegated by that department to any
other l:xx'iy or authority."

Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho at 665, 791 P.2d 410.

The

Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that administrative rules or
regulations are "less than the equivalent of statutory lall. 11

Id.

"While the poller to make lall lies exclusively lli thin the province of the
legislature (Idaho Constitution, art. 3 ~§ 1, 15), the legislature may
constitutionally leave to administrative agencies the selection of the means
and the time and place of the execution of the legislative purpose, and to that
end may prescribe suitable rules and regulations."

Mead, at 664.

"Rollever,

llhile these rules and regulations may be given the 'force and effect of lall,'
they do not rise to the level of statutory lall. 11

Id.

"[W]hat the legislature

delegated t1as not a legislative or lall making authority, but, an authority to
make rules or regulations."

Id., at 665.

Further, the Idaho Supreme Court "has consistently found the executive
rule making authority to be rooted in a legislative delegation, not a poN'er
constitutionally granted to the executive."

Id., at 667.

Another very similar and excellent case of Smith v. Florida Department
of Corrections, 920 So.2d 638 (Fla. Dist. ct. App. 2005) holds that the poN'er
to raise revenue is statutory and limited, and that the only pollers that may
be exercised by executive branch agencies are those specifically granted by
statute.

Its holding is entirely consonant llith this Court's om holdings
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lU Mead

V.

Arnell.

In Smith, the court held that a fee charged for photocopying services by
the Florida Deparbnent of Corrections to inmates tJas not supported by a specific
grant of legislative authority and tJas therefore invalid.

Id., at 643.

"Nollhere in this statute does it say that the Department may, in the discharge
of its supervisory authority over inmates in the state corrections system, assess
monetary charges for services rendered to those inmates."

Id., at 642.

"[T]here

is no specific grant of authority in this statute for the assessment by the
Deparbnent or monetary costs for any particular service provided to inmates
by the Deparbnent."

Id.

"A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority if the agency has exceeded its grant of rule making authority •••
or the rule enlarges, rncxlifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of the
latJ implemented."

Id., at 640-41.

"A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allo.tJ
an agency to adopt a rule; a specific la.tJ to be implemented is also required.
An

agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific pollers

and duties granted by the enabling statute.

No agency shall have authority

to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the
enabling legislation and is not arbitrary or capricious or is tJithin the agency's
class of pollers and duties, nor shall an agency have the authority to implement
statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy.
Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or generally describing the
pollers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no further than
implementing or interpreting the specific pollers and duties conferred by the
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same statute."

Id., at 641.

The Smith court noted that "[i]f [the statute] llere interpreted in the
manner set forth by the Department, the Deparbnent !lould have unbridled
discretion to charge an inmate for any and all services rendered by the
Department.

While one may argue that this is appropriate public policy, such

a policy decision should be made by the Legislature rather than the executive
branch."

Id., at 642.

Like!lise, in this instant appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court must also be
cognizant of the broader implications of IDOC's arguments.

Taken to its logical

and inevitable conclusion, IDOC's position NOuld alloll virtually every executive
branch department the implied, unbridled discretion to independently raise
revenue under the umbrella of their other substantive pollers.

This slippery

slope NOuld result in the unraveling of the form of government set forth in
Idaho's constitution, llould by necessity undermine every Idaho Supreme Court
decision touching on the subject of separation of pollers, and !lould reopen the
question that !las already resolved by the framers of our constitution - What
then is the legislature for?
IDOC's revenue raising scheme invades the province of the legislature
and violates Idaho Constitution, Article II, Section 1 and Idaho Code Section
20-212.
2.

The district court erred by ruling otherllise.

In the alternative, if IDOC's IDAPA Rules are an adequate "remedial
action," Searcy is still entitled to judgment and damages for the
revenue raised prior to November 2, 2012.

The district court took judicial notice that
effective November 2, 2012.

:O::XX:

promulgated IDAPA Rules

According to the district court, "[b]ecause the

Defendants have taken remedial action to promulgate ID~PA rules subject to
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legislative oversight, the court finds

OON

that the ••• photocopy fees, and

the medical co-pay fee are not a violation of the separation of poNers betNeen
the executive and legislative branches of state government pursuant to Idaho
Constitution Article II, Section 1.

In addition, the Court finds that any claim

made by the Plaintiff that the fees in question should have been promulgated
as rules pursuant to I.e.§ 20-212, is moot."
This is error.

(R, p.734, Ls.21 - p.735, Ls.2).

These IDAPA rules Nere only promulgated after and under

the pressure of this litigation.

As

set forth above, Searcy disputes that they

serve as an adequate remedy to specific statutory authority in the first
instance.

Ho.Never, if this Court holds otherNise, then Searcy is still entitled

to judgment and damages for the revenue raised prior to these IDAPA rules going
into effect on November 2, 2012.

See, SNeeney v. American Nat. Bank, et al.,

62 Idaho 544, 115 P. 2d 109, 111 ( 1 941 ) ( "The rule seems to be Nell settled that
in a proceeding for declaratory judgment the court has jurisdiction ••• to a.Nard
damages."); Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 573, 887 P.2d 1076, 1080 (ct.
App. 1994 ( "The unjust enrichment doctrine ••• alloNS recovery Nhere the
defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff Nhich it NOUld be inequitable
to retain Nithout compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit."
(citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518
P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974))); see also Addendum A, attached hereto.
This Court should reverse and remand back to the district court for this
alternative reason also.
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ISSUE II.
The district court erred in concluding that the revenue raised by IIXlC through
medical co-pays and photocopy fees does not violate Article X, Section 1 of
the Idaho Constitution by ruling that IDAPA Rules promulgated by IIXlC on
November 2, 2012 ilere a "remedial action."

Searcy incorporates in its entirety his argument fran Issue I, above, into
this Issue II argument.
Idaho Constitution, Article X, Section 1, provides that" ••• penal
institutions ••• shall be established and supported by the state in such manner
as may be prescribed by laii. 11

It "is a direction to establish the institution,

and authorizes state support but does not make such support exclusive nor

prescribe hoi! or from A7hat sources the necessary funds shall be obtained, but
leaves that to the legislature."

State ex rel. Macey v. Johnson, 50 Idaho 363,

368, 296 P. 588, 589 (1931).
Hoilever, rather than "leaving it to the legislature," IIXlC has chosen to
independently establish the state's policy by itself and has created a revenue
raising scheme that is utterly ilithout legislative authority.
IIXlC's .vhole case boils doiln to their assertion that their authority to
raise the revenue at issue is implied under the umbrella of their "express
constitutional and statutory authority to control, direct and manage the
correctional facilities, Idaho Constitution, Article X,

~

5, Idaho Code~ 20-

209, as i!ell as express statutory authority to adopt rules and regulations for
the government and discipline of the correctional facilities.
20-224."

Idaho Code§

(R, p.556).

By its om terms, the ISBOC's authority under Idaho Constitution,

Article X, Section 5 to "have control, direction and management of the
penitentiaries of the state" is limited by the phrase "Mith such compensation,
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po!17ers and duties as may be prescribed by la!17. 11

There is no exclusive,

independent authority under this provision to raise revenue for state purposes.
Notably,

:O:X:X:::

is unable to cite a single constitutional provision, statute,

or Idaho Supreme Court decision that says that the po!17er to raise revenue may
be implied under the umbrella of other substantive po!17ers.

IIXlC is essentially asking the Court to do t,170 things regarding this
provision, l:x:>th of !17hich the Court cannot do.
First, by arguing that the phrase "this board shall have the control,
direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state" someho/17 gives IDOC
exclusive, independent and unlimited po!17ers, IDOC is asking the Court to give
no effect to and to read out of the constitution the latter phrase of
such compensation, po!17ers, and duties as may be prescribed by la!17. 11
has already held that the phrase "as shall be prescribed by la/1111

11

!17ith

This Court

means that

"the po!17ers ••• [are] statutory and limited, and that such boards can only
exercise those po!17ers granted them by statute."

Fenton, 20 Idaho at 404, 119

P. at 45.

Second, IDOC is asking the Court to read into the tJOrds "control, direction
and management" an exclusive, independent and unlimited po!17er to raise revenue
in any ila.Y that it sees fit.
The Court should not do either of these t,170 things.
IDOC's arguments miss the !17hole point of Searcy's case.

It is not a

challenge to their control, direction and management of the penal system.
Rather, it challenges their authority, po!17er and the legality as to the manner
in !17h.ich they independently raise revenue in light of Idaho's constitutional
and statutory scheme on this subject.
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IDJC's revenue raising scheme exceeds the scope of authority granted under
Idaho Constitution, Article X, Section 5.

It violates Idaho Constitution,

Article X, Section 1 and the district court erred by ruling otherllise.
Additionally and in the alternative, the district court ruled, as to Idaho
Constitution, Article X, § 5, that IlX)C has "taken appropriate remedial action
to adopt IDAPA Rules concerning the department's fee structure[.]"

(R, p. 736,

Ls. 18-19).
As

set forth above, this is error.

These IDAPA rules llere only promulgated

after and under the pressure of this litigation and they are not an adequate
remedy to the lack of specific statutory authority in the first instance.
Hollever, if this Court holds otherllise, then Searcy is still entitled to judgment
and damages for the revenue raised prior to these IDAPA rules going into effect
on November 2, 2012.

See, Slleeney v. American Nat. Bank, et al., 62 Idaho 544,

115 P.2d 109, 111 (1941) ("The rule seems to be llell settled that in a proceeding
for declaratory judgment the court has jurisdiction •• to allard damages.");
Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 573, 887 P.2d 1076, 1080 (ct. App. 1994) ("The
unjust enrichment doctrine ••• allolls recovery llhere the defendant has received
a benefit fran the plaintiff llhich it llould be inequitable to retain llithout
canpensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit." (citing Continental
Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205
(1974))); see also Addendum A, attached hereto.
This Court should reverse and remand back to the district court for this
alternative reason also.
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ISSUE III.
The district court erred in concluding that the commissions charged for telephone
time and commissary goods are funds arising from the sale of goods or services
under I.C. § 67-3611 tJh.ere, under the applicable summary judgment standards,
IIXlC had the burden of satisfying all of the elements of their affirmative
statutory defense and failed to do so.
As discussed above at Footnote 3, prior to bringing this suit Searcy

specifically asked I:00:, as to the telephone and commissary revenue, that "If
you maintain that these takings and revenue raising is legal, please cite the
statute you rely on for your authority to do this."
Appendix A, p:J. A-4)).

(R, p.053 (Complaint, at

IIXlC made no claim, reference or reliance on I.C. §

67-3611 and instead relied on language and provisions from I.C. § 20-212 as
authorization for their revenue raising scheme.

(R, pp.053-055 (Complaint,

at Appendix A, p:Js. 4-6)).
In Searcy's Civil Complaint he alleges at Paragraph 35 that IIXlC "illegally
diverted rroneys belonging to Plaintiff Searcy and thousands of other persons
for IIXlC uses, Nithout express constitutional or statutory authority to do so,
(R, p.030, at ,r 35).

through phone and commissary sales commissions[.]"

In their Anstver, IIXlC made no reference to, reliance upon, nor plead any
defense based upon I.C. § 67-3611.
OA711

(R, pp.088-095).

Within the scope of their

motion for summary judgment, IIXlC again made no reference to, reliance upon,

nor plead any defense based upon I.C.

~

67-3611.

(R, pp.191-193, 411-435).

IIXlC did not disclose their defense and reliance on I.C.

~

67-3611 for the first

time until filing the last document in the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment, just days before the already scheduled hearing date.

(R, p.503).

In his partial motion for summary judgment against IIXlC as to Count I,
Searcy alleges, as to "IIXlC's revenue raising through phone and commissary sales
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canmissions" that IIXJC had "no authority for raising revenue or raising fees[.]"
(R, p. 172).
As an affirmative defense that IIXlC had the burden of proving all of the

elements at trial, IIXJC asserted, and the district court erroneously concluded,
that the phone and canmissary revenue 1vas raised under the authority of I.C.

§ 67-3611.

(R, p.503, pp.514, Ls.20 - 517, Ls.22).

As the nonmoving party, IIXlC did not meet the burden of their defense.
"Sumnary judgment must be entered against the nonmoving party Nho fails

to make a shoring sufficient to establish existence of an element, 1vhich is
essential to his case and upon Nhich he 1vill bear the burden of proof at trial."
McGilvray, 136 Idaho at 42, 28 P.3d at 383 (citations omitted).

"If the

nonmoving party cannot make a sho1ving on elements essential to his claims, "there
can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element on the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial.""
A.

Id. (citation omitted).

The Essential Elements of I.C. § 67-3611.

Idaho Cooe Section 67-3611 provides:
67-3611. EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FROM SALE OF SERVICES, RENTALS OR SALE
OF PRODUCTS BY STA'IE INSTITUTIONS. All state institutions, educational,
charitable, penal and other1vise, shall be allo1ved to expend the funds
arising from the sale of services, rentals of personal property, stock,
fam or garden produce, or other goods, or article produced 1vithin or by
the institution, for the maintenance, use and support of said institution,
1vithout reducing the amount of the appropriations made to such institutions;
all such sums received shall be deposited 1vith the state treasurer and it is
hereby made the duty of the state controller and the state treasurer to
enter deposits so received in the general fund of the state, and the state
controller shall add the deposits so received to the appropriations made
to such institutions severally; and the sums of money so received are hereby
appropriated from the general fund of the state of Idaho for the
maintenance, use and support of the institution by Nhich the same are so
received; and the said moneys shall be expended for the use and support
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of such institution for Alhich the same tJere deposited, and shall be audited
and accounted for as other appropriations to the said institution are.
( emphasis added) •
HotJever, the provisions of I.C. § 67-3611 are specifically limited by the
tenns of Idaho Code Section 67-3602, Alhich provides:
67-3602. PAYMENT OF SALARIES AND WAGES. No portion of any appropriation
made for expenses other than salaries and tJages shall be expended in payment
of salaries and tJages; but tJith the consent of the state board of examiners,
any portion of any appropriation made for the payment of salaries and tJages
may be expended for other expenses of the particular office or institution
for Alhich it is appropriated.
Therefore, by its o,m tenns, I.C. § 67-3611 requires that in order for
funds to be construed to be raised or appropriated pursuant to the statute,
the follotJing essential elements must be satisfied:
(a)

that "no portion of any appropriation made for expenses other than
salaries and tJages shall be expended in payment of salaries and tJages"
(see I.e.§ 67-3602);

(b)

that "such sums received shall be deposited tJith the state treasurer"
and "so received in the general fund of the state;" and that "the
sums of money so received are hereby appropriated from the general
fund of the state;" and

(c)

that the funds must arise "from the sale of services ••• or other
goods, or article 'produced tJithin or by the institution[.]"'
( emphasis added) •
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Id.

B.

IIXlC has failed to make a shelling of the essential elements of their
I.e.§ 67-3611 defense.
1•

IIXlC has failed to sho.v that no :EX>rtion of the funds raised by the
telephone and ccmnissary ccmnissions tvere "expended in the payment
of salaries and .llages."

This is an essential element that :moc is required to prove at trial in
asserting their r.e.

~

67-3611 defense.

See

r.e.

~

67-3602.

Theyhavenot done

so.

Indeed, the documents submitted to the Court by IlXX; in the cross-motion
summary judgment proceedings actually indicate the opposite - that the funds
are in fact being "expended in payment of salaries and .llages."

(See, R, pp.316-

317 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens at ,i: 15 ("In addition, some personnel costs
for various positions are paid from the IMF including the legal assistant/
paralegal in the Resource Center, the correctional officer in the Recreation
Department, the Religious Activities Coordinator and the Financial Specialist
.llho monitors the IMF."))).
The scope of the allegations in Searcy' s Civil Complaint, at Paragraph 35,
that IlXX; "illegally diverted moneys belonging to Plaintiff Searcy and thousands
of other persons for IlXX; uses, .llithout express constitutional or statutory
authority to do so, through phone and commissary sales camnissions" (R, p.030,
at ,i: 35), squarely challenges the legality of nx::ic' s phone and cormnissary revenue
scheme.

Searcy has a right to "have determined any question of construction

or validity arising under the ••• statute •• and obtain a declaration of rights,
status or other legal relations there under."

I.e.§ 10-1202.

I ~ has failed to sho.ll the essential element that the funds raised through
telephone and commissary revenue .llere not "expended in payment of salaries and
.llages."

See

I.e.§ 67-3602; 67-3611.
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2.

IlXlC has failed to she.Ai' that the funds received are deposited "in
the general fund" and appropriated "from the general fund."

This also is an essential element that
in asserting their I.C. § 67-3611 defense.

rr.x::>C

is required to prove at trial

They have not done so.

Indeed, the documents sul::xnitted to the Court by

rr.x::>C

in the cross-motion

summary judgment proceedings actually indicate that the funds .Ai'ere not received
in and appropriated from the C,eneral Fund.

Rather, IlXlC' s o,m submissions

indicate that the telephone and commissary rever:iue Has received in and
appropriated from the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund.

(See, R, p.195, at

mi:

4-5

(Statement of Material Facts, at ,-r 4 ("'Ihe IlXlC is funded primarily from the
State General Fund.

Other funding sources include, but are not necessarily

limited to, endo..vrnent income, cost of supervision fees, inmate labor, federal
grants, and miscellaneous revenue.

See Affidavit of Shirley Audens [R, pp.316],

,112.") and at ,I 5 ("The Miscellaneous Revenue Fund, Alhich makes up part of the

annual budget appropriated by the Legislature for the operation of the state
correction system, includes money from the inmate management fund (Il\'JF).
IMF is made up of money that is collected by the
treasury.

rr.x::>C

The

and deposited in the state

CUrrently, as set forth in IlXlC SOP 114.03.03.014 (Revenue: Offender

Management Fund), the source of these monies includes, but is not limited to:
telephone revenue; commissary revenue, vending revenue; laundry revenue; donation
revenue; and social security revenue.

See

Aff of SA, [R, pp.316] ,-r14.

See

also Civil Complaint, mI37, 52.")).
While IlXlC may argue that it is the duty of the state contoller and/or
state treasurer to ensure the funds flo.Ai' in and out of the General Fund instead
of the Miscellaneous Fund (See I.e.~ 67-3611), there are t.Ai'o important problems
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,.,rith this argument, both of ,.,rhich lie squarely upon

IIX)C

rather than the state

controller or treasurer.
First and foremost, IlXlC's hands are not clean in the matter.

Indeed,

IDOC Financial Specialist Sr. Shirley Aud.ens testified at~ 8 of her affidavit
that even though it is supposedly "the policy of the Board of Correction that
the IDOC shall manage its fiscal responsibilities in accordance ,.,rith ••• the
la,.,rs of the state of Idaho" (R, p.314, at~ 8), it is also IDOC's o,m policy
to "deposit incoming funds from the folloring sources into the State of Idaho
miscellaneous revenue fund ••• Telephone revenue [and] Commissary revenue."
(R, p.360 (Exhibit F of Affidavit of Shirley Audens

(IIX)C

SOP 114.03.03.014

(Revenue: Offender Management Fund), GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, at Section 1. Incoming
Funds, at P:J. 3 of 8 (emphasis added)))).

This is specifically contrary to

"the la,.,rs of the State of Idaho" if this is money raised pursuant to I.C. §
67-3611.

Thus, it is IlXlC themselves ,mo are responsible for depositing the

telephone and corrmissary revenue into the Miscellaneous Fund rather than the
General Fund.
Second, to the extent that the state controller and/or state treasurer
are liable and must be brought into the suit as Third-Parties, IDOC has failed
to comply ,.,rith Rule 14(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, ,mich provides:
(a) Third Party Practice-When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At
any time after commencement of the action a defendant as a third-party
plaintiff may cause to be served a summons and complaint upon a person
not a party to the action ,,rho is or may be liable to such third-party
plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the thirdparty plaintiff. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make
the service if the third-party plaintiff files the third-party complaint
not later than 10 days after serving the original ans,.,rer. Otherrise, the
third-party plaintiff must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties
to the action. The person so served, hereinafter called the third-party
defendant, shall make any defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim
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as provided in Rule 12 and any counterclaims against the third-party
plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided
in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff
any defenses Nhich the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim.
The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff
may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claims against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant
thereupon shall assert any defenses as provided in Rule 12 and any
counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. Any party may move
for severance, separate trial, or dismissal of the third-party claim; and
the court may direct a final judgment upon either the original claim or the
third-party claim alone in accordance Mith the provisions of Rule 54(b) ~·. A
third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against any person not
a party to the action Nho is or may be liable to the third-party defendant
for all of part of the claim made in the action against the third-party
defendant.
(emphasis added).
If IlX)C Nishes to blame the fact that the phone and commissary revenue
floNS in and out of the Miscellaneous Fund rather than the General Fund on the
state controller and/or state treasurer, they are free to do so and Rule 14(a)
provides them the procedural doorNay.

But to date, they have not met their

om responsibility to request leave to do this.

Regardless, Nhether IlX)C makes

the state controller and/or state treasurer Third-Parties or not,

JIXJC::

still

has the burden of proving the existence of every essential element of their
I.C. § 67-3611 defense and have not done so.
The "General Fund" remains an essential element at trial to IDOC's I.C.

§ 67-3611 defense.

IDOC has failed to shoN the essential element that the funds

raised through telephone and commissary revenue are received in, and appropriated
from, the General Fund.
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3.

An

by

IlX)C

IIXX:! has failed to sho11 that the telephone and ccmnissary funds
arise "frcm the sale of services, ••• or other goods, or article
'proouced 11ithin or by the institution."'

essential element of Idaho Code Section 67-3611 that must be satisfied
is that the telephone and corrmissary funds arise "from the sale of

services, ••• or other goods, or article 'produced 11ithin or by the
institution.'"

IlX)C

has failed to do so.

Statutory construction must begin J'lith the literal NOrds of the statute:
those 11ords must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning; and the
statute must be construed as a llhole.

Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med.

ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011).
The plain, usual and ordinary meaning of the NOrd "produce" is "to make
or manufacture [to produce steel]." Webster's Ne11 World Dictionary of the
American language, Second College Edition (1984).
IIXJC set forth in their cross-motion surrnnary judgment submissions that
they "allo11 the use of the telephones to inmates based on security needs and
resources."
Ho11ever,

(R, p.317, at~ 18 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens at~ 18 )).

IlX)C

has not put forth any evidence that this allo11ed use of telephones

is, in fact, a ser.vice "produced" (i.e., "made or manufactured") "11ithin or
by the institution."

IX>cuments submitted by IIXJC actually indicate other11ise -

that this telephone service is merely brought into the institution (as opposed
to "produced 11ithin or by the institution") from the outside by a contract
telephone vendor.

(R, p.317, at~ 18 (Affidavit of Shirley Audens at~ 18 (IMF

"is partially comprised of funds from telephone revenue, 11hich is the commission
agreed upon by the IIXJC and the telephone vendor."))).
Like11ise,

IlX)C

set forth in their cross-motion summary judgment submissions
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that a general description of the cormnissary goods is "the alloNed. food products,
med.ical, dental, and grooming items, and electronic equip:nent not provided. by
the Department of Correction but approved. for use."
(Affidavit of Shirley Audens at
at pg. 3))).

1"[

(R, p.317, at

1"[

17

17 (See, R, p.388 (Exhibit H), Policy 406,

HoNever, IIXX'. has not put forth any evidence that these items

are, in fact, "produced." (i.e. , "made or manufactured.") "Ni thin or by the
institution."

rocuments submitted. by IIXX'. indicate otherNise - that these goods

are merely brought into the institution (as opposed. to "produced." Nithin or
by the institution) by a contract cormnissary vendor.

(R, p.317, at

1"[

17

(IMF "is partially comprised. of funds from cormnissary revenue, Nhich is the
contracted. sales percentage cormnission agreed upon by t h e ~ and the cormnissary
vendor. " ) ) ) •
The question is tJhether the phrase in I.C. § 67-3611 of "produced. Nithin
or by the institution" only modi.fies the NOrd "article" or, as Searcy asserts,
modi.fies the entire list of items preced.ing that term (i.e., "the sale of
services, rentals of personal property, stock, farm or garden produce, or other
goods, or article" produced. Nithin or by the institution).
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of laN over Nhich this Court
exercises free revieN. 11 BHC rntennountain Hospital, Inc. v. Ada County, 150
Idaho 93, 95, 244 P.3d 237 (2010) (citing State v. Hensley, 145 Idaho 852, 855,
187 P.3d 1227, 1230 (2008).
"The interpretation of a statute 'must begin Nith the literal NOrds of
the statute; those NOrds must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning;
and the statute must be construed. as a tJhole.

If the statute is not ambiguous,

this Court does not construe it, but simply folloNs the laN as Nritten."
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Ada

County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 353,
298 P.3d 245 (2013) (citing Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (quoting
state v. Schlla.rtz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003))).

"A statute

is ambiguous Nb.ere the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction."

Id., at 353 (citing Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, Preston School

Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004)).
The Court "ITR.Ist look to the grarrmatical construction of the statute as
the legislature intended the statute to be construed according to generally
accepted principles of English grarrrnar."

State v. CollinstJorth, 96 Idaho 910,

914, 538 P.2d 263 (1975) (citing Nagel v. Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 408 P.2d 468
(1965)).

''When punctuation discloses a proper legislative intent or conveys

a clear meaning the courts should give tJeight to it as evidence."
Statutory Construction§ 47:15 (5th ed. 1992).

2A Sutherland

"Where a sentence contains

several antecedents and several consequents they are to be read distributively."
Id., at§ 47:26.
Here, the correct reading of I.C. § 67-3611 is that the phrase "produced
.tJithin or by the institution," modifies the entire phrase "the sale of services,
rentals or personal property, stock, fann or garden produce, or other goods,
or article" and does not only modify the tJord "article."

Under this correct

reading, the phrase provides for both the literal statutory tJording intent,
and the legislative intent, that "the funds arising from the sale of" shall
limit such sales of "services, rentals of personal property, stock, fann or
garden produce, or other goods, or article" to only those "produced tJithin or
by the institution."
OthertJise, if the phrase "produced tJithin or by the institution" is read
to only modify "article," then "the sale of services, rentals of personal
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property, stock, fann or garden produce, or other goods," tJould be virtually
unlimited.

But an "article," and only an "article," tJould have any limits

tJhatsoever, that being the article must be "produced tJithin or by the
institution." Under this definition and construction, confusion tJould reign
as to tJhether the object of the sale tJas an article (subject to the limiting
phrase) or one of the other listed items (not subject to the limiting phrase).
This tJOuld lead to an absurd result.

HotJever, this can be reconciled tJi th

the correct vietJ that the intent of the drafters should prevail by assuming
that the legislature tJOuld never have intended an absurd result.

Thus, the

correct reading of I.C. § 67-3611 is that the phrase "produced tJithin or by
the institution" modifies the entire phrase "the sale of services, rentals of
personal property, stock, fann or garden produce, or other goods, or article."
An

by

IIX)C

essential element of Idaho Code Section 67-3611 that must be satisfied
is that the sale of services or goods must be from goods or services

"produced tJithin or by the institution."

IIX)C

has failed to do so.

"Surrmary judgment must be entered against the nonmoving party tJho fails
to make a shotJing sufficient to establish existence of an element, tJhich is
essential to his case and upon tJhich he tJill bear the burden of proof at trial."
McGilvray, 136 Idaho at 42, 28 P.3d at 383 (citations omitted).

"If the

nonmoving party cannot make a shotJing on elements essential to his claims, "there
can be no genuine issue of material facts since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element on the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial. 1111

Id., at 42 ( citation omitted).

Respectfully, Searcy is entitled to surrmary judgment in his favor and the
district court erred ruling othertJise.
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V. cna:.uSION

The district court erred in issuing the j udgrnent and orders a..iarding summary
judgment in favor of IlXlC as to Count I of the Civil Complaint.
and judgment should be reversed.

As

These orders

set forth herein, this Court should allard

summary judgment in favor of Searcy as to Count I of the Civil Complaint and
remand for further proceedings consistent llith this Court's opinion.

Searcy

should be allarded his costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of May, 2014.

Plaintiff-Appellant, prose
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IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
Idaho Department of Correction

IDAPA 06.01.01
Rules of the Board of Correction

013.
DEPARTMENT FEE STRUCTURE.
In order to help the Department defray the cost of various services provided to offenders, the Department may charge
'
(11-2-12)
the following fees.

01.
Presentence Investigation Fee. Pursuant to Section 19-2516, Idaho Code, if a court orders a
presentence investigation to be conducted, the court shall order the defendant to pay up to one hundred dollars ($100)
as determined by the Department as repayment for the cost of conducting the presentence investigation and preparing
the presentence investigation report.
( 11-2-12)
02.
Cost of Supervision Fee. Pursuant to Section 20-225, Idaho Code-, the Department may charge
offenders who are on probation or parole supervision a fee up to seventy-five dollars ($75) per month. Costs of
supervision are the direct and indirect costs incurred by the Department to supervise probationers and parolees,
including tests to determine drug and alcohol use; books, and written materials to supp9rt rehabilitation efforts, and
(11-2-12)
monitoring of physical location through the use of technology.
03.
Interstate Compact Application Fee. Pursuant to Section 20-225A, Idaho Code, the Department
may charge any person under state probation or parole supervision who applies for a transfer of supervision to
another state an application fee up to one hundred dollars ($100).
(11-2-12)
04.
Maintenance/Room and Board Fee. Pursuant to Section 20-242, Idaho Code, the Department
may require that prisoners pay an amount to the Board sufficient for the prisoner's board and personal expenses, both
inside and outside the jail, facility, or residence, including costs of administering such prisoner's work furlough
program, laundry service fee, and travel or van service fee. The Department currently sets these fees in Department
(11-2-12)
standard operating procedure.
05.
Hobby Craft Surcharge. Pursuant to Department standard operating procedure, the Department
may charge offenders who participate in facility hobby craft activities a surcharge to offset the cost of hobby craft
supplies and items that are used by participating offenders, such as hobby shop tools. The Department currently sets
the fee in Department standard operating procedure.
( 11-2-12)
06.
Photo Copying Fee. Pursuant to Department standard operating procedure, the Department may
charge offenders a fee for photocopying court documents relating to qualified legal claims or other documents as
authorized by the Department. Offenders will not be denied access to courts based on their inability to pay for
photocopies related to qualified legal claims. The Department currently sets the fee in Department standard operating
(11-2-12)
procedure.
07.
Medical Co-Pay Fee. Pursuant to Section 20-209, Idaho Code, the Board shall provide for the
care, maintenance and employment of all prisoners now or hereinafter committed to its custody. In order to offset the
costs associated therewith, the Department may charge offenders a fee for medical services. The IDOC and/or
contract medical provider shall not deny an offender access to healthcare services based on the offender's inability to
(11-2-12)
pay. The Department currently sets the fee in Department standard operating procedure.
014.-103.

(RESERVED)

104.
10BACCO FREE ENVIRONMENT.
The Department and all of its property, facilities, and vehicles shall be maintained tobacco free. No person shall
possess or use tobacco products on or in vehicles or properties owned, leased, rented and operated or managed by the
Department. No offender, employee, contractor, volunteer, vendor, or intern shall possess or use tobacco products in
or on any Department work site.
(11-5-99)
01.
Applicability. Section 104 is applicable to all persons, regardless of status as public or non-public
(7-6-01)
as defined in Subsection 010.40.
02.

Exception. Tobacco products may be kept in a securely locked vehicle in a Department parking lot.

(11-5-99)

105.

VICTIM NOTIFiCATIONS.
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ADDENDUM A

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That I served bvo ( 2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, on the follo.ving named persons at their last knom
address, via the ISCI Prison legal Mail System and the U.S. Mail, 1st class
postage prepaid, on May 1st, 2014:
AndretJ C. Brassey
Megan R. Goicoechea
Brassey, Cratv'ford & Ho.vell, PLLC
203 West Main Street
PO Box 1009
Boise, ID 83701

